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1. Nord Stream 2: Controversy & policy dilemmas
The Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline project has become 
one of the most controversial issues in EU gas-related debates 
today. Its proponents – some of the biggest northwest Euro-
pean (NWE) gas companies supported more or less openly 
by governments in Berlin,1 Paris2 and Vienna – hold that the 
project is purely commercial. Its opponents – most of the Cen-
tral and East European (CEE) countries, recently backed by 
Italy3  – say that the project is political and contradictory to 
the EU goals of diversification and energy security goals. They 
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1 See remarks by German Vice Chancellor S. Gabriel during meeting 
with Russia’s President Putin: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/50582 
2 See speculations on political backing:  http://tass.ru/en/economy/832372
3 However, Italy’s move seems more a tactical one, as it has already started 
talks with Russia on possibility of joining Nord Stream 2 by Italian com-
panies see e.g. https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/saipem-gains-nord-
stream-2-095200175.html   
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have called for an EU-wide debate on the project,4 as they fear 
greater dependency on Russian gas coming from only one 
direction. Indeed, the NS2 project could undermine diversifi-
cation of gas supply sources, which remains a key goal of cur-
rent European security of supply strategy, specifically of EU 
policy in the Central and Southeastern regions.5  Its realiza-
tion would make it harder to take difficult political decisions 
concerning relations with Russia, and could also adversely 
affect relations with Ukraine, as NS2 construction would both 
indicate a return to ‘business as usual’ with Russia and result 
in lesser EU interest in energy cooperation with Ukraine.
Proponents of NS2, for their part, are worried about the future 
of EU gas market. This future, and the role of specific EU gas 
companies, is being challenged by depressed demand, rela-
tively high (consumer) prices and the uncertain role of gas in 
EU energy mix. In addition, there are supply-side problems, 
like falling internal production, the volatility of supplies 
from North Africa, and the risks entailed with imports from 
Russia – especially if they pass through Ukraine. As a major 
joint investment and long-term infrastructural connection, 
NS2 could help to address at least some of these worries by 
increasing stability of gas supplies from Russia, the biggest 
and potentially cheapest supplier – as well as possibly improv-
ing the image and competitiveness of gas on the EU market. 
Many actors view cooperation with Russia as a necessary 
condition for the revival of the gas sector, but NS2 could also 
play a political role as a possible re-opener of energy dialogue 
with Russia, preventing it from becoming a more profound 
and lasting pivot for Asia.6 Finally, EU companies engaged in 
4 http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/27/us-ukraine-crisis-nord-
stream-idUSKBN0TG0JX20151127?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
5 See e.g. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/central-
and-south-eastern-europe-gas-connectivity  on diversification and 
integration as key goals launched in early 2015 by EU and member states 
with the  CESEC initiative 
6 See e.g. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/re-
search_papers/2015RP08_gsv_wep.pdf
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the NS2 project may have their own corporate interests. Shell 
may wish to strengthen its leading position further (after 
acquiring, in early 2015, worth USD 70 billion British Gas’s 
shares, and the significant strengthening of position on the 
global LNG market). Austria’s OMV wants to counterbalance 
challenges to its position on the Central European gas market 
and the future of the Central European Gas Hub (CEGH), such 
as the collapse of the Nabucco and the South Stream projects 
and the fall in export of Russian gas via Ukraine. German 
companies might be aiming at strengthening both their own 
and Germany’s role in the European trade and transit of gas – 
a role which has increased significantly since the worsening 
of the Russian–Ukrainian gas conflict from mid-2014.7 
Divergent views and interests of CEE and NWE countries are 
to certain extent reflected in the EU approach to the issue. EU 
institutions have been rather sceptical regarding NS2 itself. 
Both the Commissioner for Climate and Energy and the Vice 
President for Energy Union have warned that the project will 
not provide for diversification of sources or routes of gas supply 
to the EU, and that the EU Commission will rigorously assess its 
conformity with EU rules.8 Similar concerns were expressed by 
the European Parliament in its resolution on EU Energy Union 
strategy9 and by the European Council, which in December 
2015 called for any new infrastructure to comply with both EU 
law (third package) and Energy Union objectives.10 At the same 
time there have also been calls from some key EU politicians – 
like German Minister of Foreign Affairs F.-W. Steinmeier11  and 
EC President J.C. Juncker12 – for rapprochement in economic 
and energy relations with Russia. The persistence of intra-EU 
differences can negatively impact the process of policymaking 
in the EU, as well as the consistency of EU energy policy itself 
and specific gas-related strategies.
Current debate on the NS2 project goes beyond energy, 
as questions about the desired shape of EU relations with 
Russia or Ukraine are also discussed. The NS2 agreement, 
which was signed without consultation with partners in the 
EU (neighbouring states, other companies, EU institutions), 
give rise to questions about the rules of the game when it 
comes to projects of strategic, pan-European significance. 
How should the EU proceed in such cases, especially if they 
fuel internal controversies? What is and should be the role of 
specific actors and institutions, and the relationship between 
commercial and political actors in shaping EU energy policy? 
The opinions of EU institutions about new infrastructural 
projects may well influence the decision-making process – 
but the final decisions are taken by investors who risk their 
money13 and thus significantly co-shape the EU gas market 
and in consequence set limits on the feasibility of some EU 
energy-policy goals (as defined until now) and the role of the 
European Commission as regards project realization. 
2. The new context
The idea of expanding the existing Nord Stream gas pipeline is 
not new:14 what is surprising has been the  re-emergence of the 
project in mid-2015, in the current political context.15 NS2 is 
to follow the same route as the original Nord Stream, have the 
same capacity (55bcm) and be constructed by a similar con-
sortium where Russia’s Gazprom holds 50% of the shares, with 
the remainder belonging to northwest European companies 
(this time: German Eon & BASF, French ENGIE, Dutch Shell 
and Austrian OMV). These companies can get access to Russian 
upstream on the asset-swap basis:  BASF has already finalized 
such agreements, while OMV is negotiating the details. Also 
the estimated costs – ca €8 billion – are similar. The project 
should be less complicated technologically and legally; and 
gas would be landed in the same area in Germany, for further 
distribution within the EU.
However, the global and EU gas market context has changed. 
The shale revolution, and growing volumes and decreasing 
prices of both LNG and piped gas, translate into oversup-
ply and increased gas-to-gas competition. Ongoing market 
liberalization and integration mean greater flexibility in the 
European market. Within the EU, the demand for gas has been 
decreasing since 2008, with gas being pushed out from the 
EU energy mix by coal and renewables. This trend is expected 
to continue,16 but due to decreasing internal production17 
and stalled developments in unconventional gas, European 
gas imports will keep growing. Assessing future gas needs is 
difficult, due to sustained uncertainties related to the final 
shape of European electricity/gas markets, EU energy-policy 
design, and implementation of 2030 goals. This negatively 
affects the situation for the European gas companies that have 
been shelving increasing numbers of gas-fired power plants 
and changing their strategies. They want the EU to be more 
clear on its gas-related goals.18 Those factors also negatively 
influence the feasibility of future investments in EU internal 
gas infrastructure, creating a vicious circle where the lack of 
infrastructure hinders market flexibility, security of gas supply, 
as well as a (potential) revival of gas demand. 
3 LDC Argentina S.A. has been controlled since 2007 by Galba SA (75 %), a 
company resident in Switzerland, and related to LDC.The headquarters of 
the LDC group are in the Netherlands. Ultimate control is ina trust named 
Akira, whose beneficial owner is the Luis Dreyfus family.
4  Sixth paragraph incorporated by Article 2 of the Law N° 25.784 of October 
2003, following the fifth paragraph of Article 15 of the Profit Tax Law(“Ley 
de Impuesto a las Ganancias”), text ordered by in 1997 and its modifica-
tions.It is called the sixth method because it was incorporated after the 
five methods for transfer pricing valuation described in Article 15, which 
consist of the traditional transactional methods (the Comparable Uncon-
trolled Price Method, the Resale Method and the Cost Plus Method); and 
the transactional profit methods (Transactional Net Margin Method and 
the Profit Split Method). The sixth method is applicable to commodities 
and is distinct because it draws a comparison with a market quote, instead 
of allowing the comparison to be made with transactions and prices agreed 
between unrelated parties. For more details see Grondona [2014].
7 See http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-06-24/
gazproms-call-proposals-how-many-new-gas-pipelines-to-europe 
8 See e.g. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5797_en.htm 
9 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0444+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
10 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/18-
euco-conclusions/ 
11 See http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4ee93654-9840-11e5-9228-
87e603d47bdc.html#axzz3t9OTpXZc
12 See http://www.dw.com/en/eu-commission-kremlin-confirm-juncker-
letter-to-putin/a-18863225 
13 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0028981c-ae56-11e5-b955-
1a1d298b6250.html#axzz3wHZgkjKn
14 It was raised by Gazprom back in 2011, then aimed primarily at sup-
plying UK gas market. From then and until 2014 was part of the EU’s 
gas network development plans. See: http://www.entsog.eu/publica-
tions/tyndp/2013#ENTSOG-TEN-YEAR-NETWORK-DEVELOPMENT-
PLAN-2013-2022 
15 Tense EU–Russia relations, sanctions regime.
16 See IEA WEO 2015.
17 On subsequent Groningen production caps, see: http://www.reuters.
com/article/2015/11/18/netherlands-gas-groningen-idUSL8N13D-
1CO20151118 
18 See interview with CEO of German Uniper K. Schaffer calling for an EU 
gas target unrelated to renewables or energy efficiency targets as a way of 
increasing security of demand: http://www.energypost.eu/klaus-schafer-
future-ceo-uniper-eu-set-target-gas/ 
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3. Rethinking Gazprom’s strategy
The situation on the European and global gas market negatively 
impacts the results of Gazprom. Its exports to both the EU and 
the CIS decreased significantly in 2014;19 the prices are also 
lower at EU gas hubs20 and – due to low oil prices - in long-term 
oil-indexed contracts. In 2016 the average price of Russian gas 
for European consumers is expected to be at approx. USD 200 
/tcm, the lowest in 11 years.21 Also tense EU–Russia political 
relations resulting from the Ukraine crisis play a part: in addi-
tion to sanctions and freezing of bilateral gas consultations, 
the EU has intensified its attempts to diversify gas imports and 
decrease its dependency on Russian gas.22   
Challenges on Gazprom’s key external market come in addi-
tion to those at home, where gas demand has been decreasing 
since 2011, and Gazprom faces increased competition from 
other gas producers (mostly Rosneft and Novatek). In conse-
quence, Gazprom’s share in the domestic gas market dropped 
from 83.5% in 2007 to 69% in 2014.23 The two main competi-
tors have also been lobbying for liberalization of Russian gas 
exports, and in 2013 managed to achieve right for independ-
ent from Gazprom LNG sales. 
In response to challenges with the EU, in 2014 Moscow 
intensified its attempts to diversify Russian gas export mar-
kets, especially by speeding up agreements with gas-hungry 
China.  However, challenges linked to financing new gas 
pipelines to China and related upstream projects,25 economic 
problems in Russia, increased competition, and lower prices 
on global gas markets (including LNG), combined with 
recently depressed Asian demand, may further postpone the 
opening of new markets for Russian gas – which would in 
any case have been feasible only in the longer term.
 
In consequence, the importance of EU gas market for Russian 
gas exports has been reaffirmed and Gazprom has had to rethink 
its European strategy. Gazprom seems, at least at present, to be 
refocusing from defence of its gas prices to defence of its mar-
ket share in the EU, and has shown greater openness towards 
adapting to the changing market and regulatory settings in 
Europe. This might explain Gazprom’s apparent interest in set-
tling the antitrust case with the European Commission.26  
19 by  over 17% y/y in 2014 for the EU, and for the CIS by almost 20%  – calcu-
lated on the basis of data from Gazprom’s Annual Reports www.gazprom.com 
20 What has been proven recently inter alia by decision of Ukrainian Naftogaz 
to stop gas imports from Gazprom as buying gas at EU gas hubs is cheaper: 
http://www.argusmedia.com/News/Article?id=1142681 
21 According to Gazprom’s own estimates from late 2015; see  http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-23/gazprom-said-to-see-its-low-
est-eu-gas-price-in-11-years-in-2016
22 See e.g. European Energy Security Strategy or EU LNG and gas storage 
strategy (still being developed).
23 See: http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/gas/ 
24 It had signed an agreement on gas exports and Russia–China pipeline 
construction (‘Power of Siberia’) and started negotiations of one other (the 
Altai pipeline project).
25 Details regarding gas prices or financing of Power of Siberia construction 
remain unclear.
26 Gazprom is said to have submitted a proposal for such a settlement, in 
parallel to issuing a formal response to EC allegations. See e.g. http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/16f9906a-6067-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.
html#axzz3sgXQ6kGQ 
Gazprom focuses on increasing its flexibility of operating on 
more liquid and volatile EU market. It seems more open to try 
new solutions in gas trade with the EU, such as selling gas via 
auctions27 and increasing the role of spot prices,28 and is pay-
ing more attention to the ‘liquid’ segment of EU gas market 
(more frequently entering gas-to-gas competition and selling 
more gas on European hubs). It also has been enhancing its 
access to EU storage and other gas infrastructure, for instance, 
through the recent asset-swap with BASF and the forthcoming 
asset-swap with OMV, as well as through building additional 
gas pipelines to Europe, like the proposed Turkish Stream or 
NS2. Gazprom’s interest in the LNG market29 marks another 
step in this direction. 
Gazprom’s partnership with northwest European gas compa-
nies is an important instrument in its policy. The Nord Stream 
2 agreement also shows that, in its attempt to defend its mar-
ket share, Gazprom – contrary to Norway30 – may be ready to 
play quite boldly, and, despite poor EU demand forecasts, may 
launch large and expensive projects.
 
4. What does all this mean for the EU gas market?
NS2 would double capacity of the existing direct export 
route to Germany, and, via the German network, further to 
the other EU counties. The new Baltic route would be only 
slightly smaller than the existing Ukrainian route (110bcm vs 
~142bcm/y). Additional capacity would enable Gazprom to 
step up the volume of its exports to the EU relatively quickly, 
in the case of increasing gas demand or import needs (like a 
further fall in EU gas production,31 or unexpected cuts in Nor-
way’s gas exports). Moreover, it would, in the short to medium 
term, constitute mainly a surplus capacity, as existing capacity 
is not fully utilized – in 2014, available capacity for Russian 
gas exports to Europe and Turkey was at ~ 307bcm, while Rus-
sian gas exports amounted to less than 147bcm.
Construction of Nord Stream 2 would make Russia less depend-
ent on transit via third countries – Ukraine (and Slovakia) but 
also Belarus (and Poland). Furthermore, and possibly even to 
a greater extent, it would increase Gazprom’s possibilities for 
choosing optimal routes for gas supply to delivery points agreed 
with its EU consumers. Along with other Gazprom assets in the 
EU gas infrastructure,32 NS2 would thus increase Gazprom’s 
flexibility in operating on the EU gas market. That could in turn 
lead to heightened uncertainty about the level of utilization 
and profitability of existing transit infrastructure – in Ukraine, 
 27 See first auctions or reported Gazprom Export intention of auctioning gas 
for Baltic states supplies after contracts expiry http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-09-10/gazprom-prefers-price-over-volume-in-first-eu-
gas-auctions, http://tass.ru/en/economy/833559 
28 alleged Gazprom’s promise to its Nord Stream 2 consortium partners to in-
crease sales at spot prices http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-gazprom-
spot-exclusive-idUKKCN0S72FC20151013 
29 See e.g. http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Gazprom-Sees-
LNG-As-Key-To-Its-Future.html
30 Norway’s Minister of Petroleum and Energy has called for assurances related 
to EU gas demand if Norwegian companies were to build gas pipelines from 
Barents Sea gas fields to Europe http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b74ad666-
9526-11e5-8389-7c9ccf83dceb.html#axzz3t9OTpXZc 
31 E.g. next production caps in the Netherlands see : http://uk.reuters.com/arti-
cle/uk-russia-gazprom-spot-exclusive-idUKKCN0S72FC20151013
32 E.g. Gascade gas pipelines, shares in storage facilities in Latvia or Germany.
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Slovakia, Belarus and Poland – adding to the problems faced 
today by European transmission system operators and further 
complicating the planning of network development (especially 
in the CEE countries). NS2 could also stimulate the development 
of specific links or interconnectors (such as onshore legs in Ger-
many) and increase use of existing ones33 for transmission of 
gas from the Nord Stream system. In consequence NS2 could co-
shape infrastructure use and development in NWE but also CEE. 
Specifically, it could fill the existing and planned North–South 
Gas Corridor links in Central Europe with Russian gas, and limit 
the capacities available for gas from non-Russian sources.
In the context of growing liberalization of the EU gas market and 
the flexibility of Gazprom’s supply to the EU,34 NS2 could further 
increase Russian gas supplies to chosen European hubs – in Ger-
many (NCG, GPL) or Netherlands (TTF) – at competitive prices. 
This could lead to an increase of Gazprom’s share there, as well 
as its ability to influence prices. The option of swinging volumes 
of supply to specific hubs (in theory Gazprom would be able to 
send over 140bcm of gas to the German market through both NS2 
and Yamal–Europe, while retaining the possibility of supply via 
Ukraine–Slovakia) would strengthen Gazprom’s leverage on the 
NWE gas market. At the same time the declared intention to send 
substantial volumes of gas from the NS2 to Baumgarten (Central 
European Gas Hub),35 combined with the ability to supply gas also 
via Ukraine, would allow Gazprom to at least maintain the Rus-
sian gas share on this hub and on the Central European market. 
A greater share in the key European hubs, supported by rela-
tively low gas-production costs in Russia, would allow for more 
effective competition with gas supplies from alternative sources. 
The availability of potentially large volumes of cheap Russian 
gas could impact LNG supplies to both NWE and CEE. This 
could limit imports via existing infrastructure (LNG terminals 
in Klaipeda or Swinoujscie) and hamper the construction of 
new facilities aimed at greater diversification of sources (e.g. 
Wilhelmshaven LNG terminal). Simply the perspective of NS2 
being constructed could limit the willingness of EU customers 
to sign longer-term LNG supply contracts. It might also influence 
the share of Norwegian gas in this part of Europe: in the short 
run, if Gazprom enters into effective price-competition on Euro-
pean gas hubs, and in the longer run by constituting yet another 
factor (together with weak EU gas demand) that would decrease 
the economic viability of new upstream or infrastructural invest-
ments, such as the construction of pipelines from the Arctic.
Construction of Nord Stream 2 could also strengthen the Rus-
sian–German gas partnership on several levels. It could lead 
to a greater share of Russian gas in the German market. Despite 
the currently decreasing gas consumption, the ongoing energy 
transformation on the one hand and the drop in EU internal 
gas production on the other could translate into a comeback 
of the ‘gas as a transition fuel’ policy, with increased demand 
for gas imports to Germany. In addition, it could contribute to 
greater importance of the German gas market in the EU: this 
could mean more gas trade on German hubs, more gas transit 
via Germany to other parts of the EU including the Austrian 
CEGH hub, and the development of German gas infrastructure 
(storage facilities, pipelines) needed for connecting the NS2 
project to German and EU gas networks. Therefore NS2 could 
co-shape the development of the German gas market and 
infrastructure, help to raise the importance of the German and 
Austrian hubs (with potentially even a merger of German and 
Dutch hubs).  Increased imports of Russian gas to Germany, 
together with bigger Gazprom investments in German infra-
structure (existing shares in pipelines, storage and possibly 
new ones) and the significance of cooperation with Russia 
for the prosperity of the German gas sector – and the German 
economy in general – would in turn translate into greater Ger-
man dependence on Russian gas.
33 as was the case of Lanzhot Czech–Slovak border point http://www.icis.com/
resources/news/2014/09/23/9823215/czech-to-slovakia-natural-gas-flows-
increase-after-lanzhot-capacity-expansion/?cmpid=SOC|RSS|twitter|FreeNew
sFeed
 34 Long-term contracts supplemented by shorter-term ones, decreasing role of 
transit contracts, changes in pricing, removal of destination clauses etc.
35 Supported by the possibility of obtaining substantial exemptions from EU rule 
of Third Party Access for Nord Stream 2 onshore German/European legs, as 
was the case with NEL (Nordeuropäische Erdgasleitung) and  OPAL (Ostsee-
Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung) gas pipelines.
